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Introduction
An important element of the European governance of emerging technologies is 
the European Union (EU) Framework Programme (FP) rules on dual-use 
research. This chapter analyses the challenges that might arise in implementing 
them at the project level and the ways to tackle these challenges. To do that, it 
draws on the work of one of the largest projects ever funded by the FP, namely, 
the Human Brain Project (HBP), which is also one of the large-scale inter-
national neuroscience initiatives.
Neuroscience is seen as one of the most promising technologies of the 
twenty-first century that is expected to provide cures for mental disorders and 
contribute to the development of other technologies such as Information and 
Communication Technologies (ICT) and Artificial Intelligence (AI). At the same 
time, advances in neuroscience raise major concerns about potential misuse of 
sensitive research results. Neuroscience is seen as inherently a dual-use technology, 
which can be used for beneficial as well as harmful purposes (Ienca, Jotterand 
and Elger 2018).
Against this background, this chapter focuses on the governance of dual-use 
research in neuroscience in the EU. At a time when many countries are making 
unprecedented investments in the field of neuroscience, which sometimes are 
described as the ‘gold rush’ or ‘golden age’ of neuroscience, the European 
Commission has been supporting neuroscience – or brain research as it is some-
times called – via its research and innovation FP. In the FP7 that lasted from 
2007–2013, the Commission invested €3.1 billion in neuroscience. In the first 
five years (until November 2018) of the following Horizon 2020 programme, a 
similar sum of €3.2 billion was invested (European Commission 2019a). This 
funding supports a number of neuroscience research projects included within the 
Future and Emerging Technologies (FET) programme.
The biggest EU project in this area is one of the FET Flagships projects – the 
HBP. The HBP is a ten-year, large-scale, multidisciplinary project (2013–2023), 
with an EU funding of approximately €400 million, bringing together more than 
500 scientists and engineers at more than 100 universities and research institutes 
in some 20 countries (Human Brain Project 2020; Stahl et al. 2019). It is one of 
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the large-scale neuroscience research projects in the world. Other major brain 
research initiatives have been launched or are about to be launched by the 
United States, Canada, Japan, South Korea, China and Australia (Savage 2019). 
These seven major neuroscience projects have established an International Brain 
Initiative, which is supported by the Kavli Foundation (International Brain Initi-
ative 2020). While the International Brain Initiative aims to help these diverse 
projects to work together, it is also clear that they operate under very different 
governance, regulatory and ethical frameworks.
What is specific about the governance of neuroscience in the EU? At the 
moment, the EU has not adopted either a binding legislation or voluntary code of 
conduct or guidelines specifically dedicated to neuroscience, as has been the 
case in other technological areas (e.g. nano, AI; see Csernatoni and Lavallée, 
Chapter 13 in this book). However, all neuroscience research that is funded by 
the EU FPs is governed by specific regulations and rules, which notably specify 
that selected projects should have an exclusive focus on civil applications. This 
requirement distinguishes the EU’s HBP from some of the other major brain 
initiatives around the world, in particular from the US Brain Initiative, which 
has been partly funded by the Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA) with an explicit focus on developing neurotechnology for military use 
(DARPA 2020).
Thus, in the context when there is a clear military interest in the advance-
ments of neuroscience that can be used for military purposes, it is necessary to 
better understand how the EU FP’s commitment to fund only research that has 
an exclusive focus on civil applications can be implemented and what chal-
lenges might emerge in this process. Accordingly, the main research questions 
addressed in this chapter are – how is dual-use research in neuroscience gov-
erned in the EU and what challenges does it face?
To address these questions, this chapter first introduces the main EU initiative 
in neuroscience research – the HBP and the way dual-use research is tackled in 
the HBP, which goes beyond the compulsory EU framework and additionally 
applies the Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) approach to deal with 
the dual-use issues. Second, the chapter reviews the main concepts of dual-use 
and RRI. Third, the chapter looks at the main actors involved in the governance 
of dual-use research in the HBP. Fourth, the chapter discusses challenges of 
governing dual-use research at the project level. Thus, this chapter aims to con-
tribute to the studies of the European governance of emerging technologies by 
focusing on the governance of dual-use research in the fast-developing field of 
neuroscience at the project level by analysing one of the biggest research pro-
jects ever funded by the EU – the HBP.
The chapter draws on the review of academic literature and policy docu-
ments, as well as on the author’s critical reflection on her two-year experience 
(December 2017–November 2019) of contributing to the development of the 
governance of dual-use research in the HBP, where she participated in the devel-
opment of Opinion on Responsible Dual-Use and is co-chairing the HBP Dual 
Use Working Group.
Governance of dual-use research in the EU  3
The governance of dual-use research   
in neuroscience in the EU: the case of the  
Human Brain Project
The HBP was launched in 2013 as one of the two initial FET Flagship initiatives 
(with Graphene being the other one). Building on its well-regarded FET funding 
programme, the European Commission developed the FET Flagship model for 
large-scale multidisciplinary projects. This new funding model was established 
during a time of austerity with an aim to move the ICT research frontiers and 
establish the global EU leadership in FET research. According to the European 
Commission, the FET Flagships are ‘visionary, science-driven, large-scale initi-
atives addressing grand scientific and technological (S&T) challenges’ (2014). 
While the FET Flagships are often presented as ‘one billion projects’, in reality, 
the FPs fund only part of that amount (e.g. for the HBP, approximately 40 per 
cent) and the projects are expected to raise additional funding from other sources 
such as industry and national governments.
Thus, the HBP is supported by the EU funding for multidisciplinary ICT 
research and it aims to integrate research from neuroscience, computing and 
other research fields and scientific disciplines. According to the Commission, the 
HBP was launched with a promise that it:
will create the world’s largest experimental facility for developing the most 
detailed model of the brain, for studying how the human brain works and 
ultimately to develop personalised treatment of neurological and related dis-
eases. This research lays the scientific and technical foundations for medical 
progress that has the potential to will dramatically improve the quality of 
life for millions of Europeans.
(European Commission 2013)
While the original FP funding for this project is planned until 2023, it is envis-
aged to be turned into sustainable research infrastructure that helps to advance 
neuroscience, medicine and computing (Amunts et al. 2019). This research 
infrastructure aims to provide access to a wide range of brain data and comput-
ing services. The work in the HBP is organised according to a number of divi-
sions such as Neuroinformatics, Brain Simulation, High Performance Analytics 
and Computing, Medical Informatics, Neuromorphic Computing and Neuroro-
botics. The HBP also has a dedicated Ethics and Society division that includes 
work on foresight, public engagement, compliance and researchers’ awareness. 
Dual-use is one of the key ethical issues that the HBP has addressed.
As the project is funded by the FPs (initially by the FP7 and afterwards by the 
Horizon 2020), the HBP has to comply with the relevant regulations. Ethical 
principles set out in Article 19 of the Horizon 2020 regulation stipulate that 
‘research and innovation activities carried out under Horizon 2020 shall have an 
exclusive focus on civil applications’ (European Parliament and the Council of 
the EU 2013). Issues of dual-use, exclusive focus on civil applications and 
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potential misuse of research results is part of the Horizon 2020 ethics issues 
checklist and ethics self-assessment, which form part of the grant proposal, later 
becoming part of the grant agreement and can give rise to binding obligations 
that may be controlled through ethics checks, reviews and audits (European 
Commission 2019b).
The Commission’s guidance document for completing the ethics self-assessment 
for Horizon 2020 draws on the EU Export Control Regulation in defining dual-
use (European Commission 2019b; see Vila Seoane, Chapter 5 in this book). 
Accordingly, it focuses on research involving dual-use items that ‘are normally 
used for civilian purposes but might have military applications, or may con-
tribute to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction’ (European Commission 
2019b: 33). Furthermore, this guidance document specifies that exclusive focus 
on civil applications:
does not rule out the participation of military partners or the development of 
generic technologies, products or knowledge that may meet the needs of both 
civil and military end-users (known as ‘dual-use’ goods or technologies), 
provided that the research itself has a clear focus on civil applications.
(European Commission 2019b: 35)
Additionally, the ethics issues checklist includes a question about a potential for 
misuse of research results that concerns ‘research involving or generating mater-
ials, methods, technologies or knowledge that could be misused for unethical 
purposes’ (European Commission 2019b: 37).
In practice, a number of challenges emerge in answering and dealing with 
these important questions. To address these challenges, the HBP Ethics and 
Society division has undertaken a broad research and practice agenda that 
focuses on applying the Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) approach. 
The RRI will be introduced in the following section dedicated to explaining the 
key concepts, while the application of RRI in the HBP will be addressed in the 
later sections on actors and challenges.
What are dual-use research and Responsible  
Research and Innovation?
This section will review the literature on the key concepts used in this chapter: 
dual-use research and RRI.
Dual-use research
The concept of dual-use research and technology is rather imprecise and contested 
(see Martins and Ahmad, Chapter 3 in this book). Traditionally, research and tech-
nology have been considered to be dual-use when they have current or potential 
military and civilian applications, recognising that distinction between military and 
civilian technologies is not sharp and clear-cut (see, e.g., Molas-Gallart 1997). 
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It can include both turning civilian/benevolent technology into military/hostile 
uses as well as turning military technology into civilian (e.g. Vogel et al. 2017). 
The dual-use concept has been questioned analytically because it simplifies the 
link between scientific knowledge and technological innovation (Vogel et al. 
2017: 977).
While historically, the meaning of dual-use had a military–civilian connota-
tion, today it is used more generally to distinguish research that has the potential 
to have benevolent/beneficial as well as malevolent/harmful applications 
(Oltmann 2015). Tara Mahfoud and her colleagues (2018) highlight the problem 
that distinguishing between military and civilian applications of scientific 
research and technology has become increasingly difficult. They call for a more 
nuanced framework that would go beyond the binary world implied by the term 
‘dual-use’. According to them, policy makers and regulators need to identify and 
focus on undesirable uses in the political, security, intelligence and military 
domains (Mahfoud et al. 2018).
To clarify some of the questions involved, new terms such as ‘intentional 
misuse’ and ‘dual-use research of concern’ (DURC) have been introduced 
(Ienca et al. 2018: 269). The DURC label was introduced by the United 
States government to prevent the malicious application of life science 
research. While historically most attention to dual-use technology emerged in 
fields of molecular and cell biology, recently the focus has expanded to other 
fields such as neurotechnology (Ienca et al. 2018) and ICT (Langley and 
 Parkinson 2017).
Attitudes towards dual-use research and technology have varied considerably 
across times, areas of activity and political beliefs. Haico Te Kulve and Wim 
Smit (2003) explained how the meaning of dual-use technology historically has 
shifted from a problematic to a desirable feature. According to Te Kulve and 
Smit, during the Cold War,
dual-use was viewed as a negative feature that complicated export controls: 
countries might try to obtain military sensitive technology under the guise 
of buying civilian technology. The presumed dual nature of some products 
and technologies also created tensions between the economic and defence 
perspective on technology exports.
(Te Kulve and Smit 2003: 955–956)
Te Kulve and Smit noticed a profound change in the discourse on dual-use products 
by the time the Cold War had ended, highlighting that then:
rather than a negative feature, the dual-use aspect of technology was viewed 
as something that should be promoted and pursued, as it might solve the 
twin problem of maintaining a high tech defence technology base restrained 
by limited budgets, and improving a country’s economic competitiveness 
by a more efficient allocation of R&D funds.
(Te Kulve and Smit 2003: 956)
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Similarly, Jordi Molas-Gallart (1997) demonstrates different understandings 
of dual-use technology from an arms control and industrial perspectives. 
According to him, ‘from an arms control outlook, dual-use technology has been 
seen as a problem for the control of the international diffusion of advanced 
weaponry’, while from industrial perspective, it is perceived ‘as providing an 
opportunity for the wider exploitation of research and manufacturing efforts 
beyond their initial (military or civilian) use’ (Molas-Gallart 1997: 370). Major 
differences in attitudes towards dual-use research and technology can also be 
seen when comparing the approach in research and innovation policy to promote 
dual-use research and technology (e.g. Molas-Gallart 1997) with the calls in bio- and 
neuro-ethics to regulate dual-use technology (e.g. Ienca et al. 2018).
Diverging attitudes become even more pronounced in the area of military 
research and technology that is related but not identical to dual-use research. 
Economists often emphasise many benefits for civilian technologies such as 
computers, electronics and commercial airspace technology that have originated 
from military research. A well-known example is the iPhone. Many technologies 
behind the iPhone have originated from defence research funded by DARPA, 
Department of Defence, US military and Army Research Office (Mazzucato 
2013). However, the opposite argument emphasises the problem that military 
research leads to ‘the diversion of funding from better understanding of root 
causes of insecurity’ and therefore should be reduced (Langley and Parkinson 
2017: 205).
Moreover, there are diverse views on the interaction and relationship between 
civilian, military and dual-use research and technology. In their case study of the 
development of an advanced battery in the Netherlands, Te Kulve and Smit 
investigate the cooperation between civilian and military actors and conclude 
that ‘in view of the difficulties of realising civilian–military integrated joint 
development projects, the establishment of “dual capacity networks” is sug-
gested as part of possible strategy towards an integrated civilian–military tech-
nology and industrial base’ (2003: 955). In other contexts, interactions between 
civilian and military research are more restricted, either due to the secrecy of 
military research or because of funding rules such as the EU FP that require 
exclusive focus on civilian applications (but does not prohibit the participation 
of military partners).
The implementation of the EU FP rule about an exclusive focus on civil 
applications faces old and new challenges. Jakob Edler and Andrew James 
(2015) pointed out that already in the mid-1990s the European Commission 
itself recognised that, although the FP is civilian in focus, half of all FP-funded 
projects have had a strong dual-use dimension in particular in areas such as 
aero nautics, information technology and materials. Furthermore, since the FP7, 
a programme dedicated to security research has been introduced within the FPs 
(see Martins and Ahmad, Chapter 3 in this book). Recently, new defence-related 
EU research funding mechanisms have emerged outside the FPs (see Fiott, 
Chapter 2 in this book). These include explicit funding for dual-use research 
from the European Structural and Investment Funds as well as dedicated defence 
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research funding from the European Defence Fund (EDF). The 2017 Communi-
cation from the European Commission on launching the EDF envisages that the 
planned funding for the EDF ‘would make the EU one of the biggest defence 
R&T investors in Europe and the first investor in collaborative defence research’ 
(European Commission 2017). It also stipulates that the EDF research proposals 
‘will be reviewed in relation to ethical, legal, or societal aspects by a group of 
experts on defence ethical and legal issues’ and that the precise relationship 
between the EDF and the future FPs will be determined (European Commission 
2017). These developments increase the complexity of dual-use research in EU 
countries and can raise new practical challenges, for example, if a research 
group receives funding from both – the FP with its exclusive focus on civil 
applications and the EDF – how does it practically separate in its lab its research 
with exclusive focus on civil applications from its defence research.
In the literature on dual-use research, a number of approaches have been 
 suggested for addressing some of the challenges. These include regulation, self-
regulation and education (Engel-Glatter and Ienca 2018) as well as participatory 
governance with a broader public input (Vogel et al. 2017). Putting these meas-
ures in place could intensify the tension between scientific freedom and public 
interest.
In recent years, many of these issues related to dual-use and the relationship 
between military and civilian research have been discussed in the context of 
neuroscience research (Ienca et al. 2018; Mahfoud et al. 2018; Royal Society 
2012; Tennison and Moreno 2012). Concerns about dual-use and misuse of 
neuroscience are particularly relevant due to military funding for neurotechnolo-
gies in countries such as the USA and its applications including warfighter 
enhancement or neuroscientific deception detection and interrogation. For these 
reasons, Ienca and his colleagues (2018) suggest a ‘neurosecurity framework’ 
involving calibrated regulation, (neuro)ethical guidelines and awareness-raising 
activities within the scientific community.
Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI)
In the past ten years, the RRI approach has been promoted by researchers and 
funding agencies across Europe as a way to shape research and innovation 
towards social goods (De Saille 2015). According to a well-known definition by 
Jack Stilgoe, Richard Owen and Phil Macnaghton, ‘responsible innovation 
means taking care of the future through collective stewardship of science and 
innovation in the present’ (Stilgoe, Owen and Macnaghton 2013:1570). They 
operationalise responsible innovation along four dimensions of anticipation, 
reflexivity, inclusion and responsiveness.
The European Commission has been one of the major supporters of the RRI 
approach. The Horizon 2020 regulation recognises RRI as a cross-cutting issue 
that has to be promoted to improve societal engagement in research and innovation 
(European Parliament and the Council of the EU 2013). RRI is implemented in 
the Horizon 2020 via supporting thematic elements of RRI such as public 
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engagement, open access, gender, ethics and science education as well as via 
integrated actions that foster uptake of the RRI approach by institutions and stake-
holders (European Commission 2019c). One of the main political documents on 
RRI is the Rome Declaration on Responsible Research and Innovation in Europe, 
which defines RRI as an ‘on-going process of aligning research and innovation to 
the values, needs and expectations of society’ (Italian Presidency of the Council of 
the EU 2014). While the European Commission has extensively supported the 
implementation of RRI during the Horizon 2020, due to shifting political priorities 
(e.g. towards mission-oriented research), it is unlikely that RRI will receive the 
same amount of support in the following Horizon Europe programme.
Furthermore, a number of national research funding councils are also imple-
menting the RRI approach. One of the first funders that started to implement this 
approach was the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council 
(EPSRC) in the UK. The EPSRC approach to responsible innovation highlights 
the need to continuously seek to anticipate, reflect, engage and act and is there-
fore known as the AREA framework (EPSRC 2019). According to this 
approach, anticipation implies describing and analysing intended and unintended 
economic, social, environmental and other possible impacts of innovation, while 
reflection focuses on purposes, motivations and potential implications of 
research and associated uncertainties. Engagement allows the opening up future 
visions to broader deliberation and dialogue, but action aims to influence the 
direction and trajectory of the research and innovation process itself.
While the RRI approach has an important aim of aligning research and 
innovation with societal values and needs, its practical implementation experi-
ences a number of well-known research governance challenges, for example, 
how to deal with the diversity of societal values, what is the right balance 
between academic freedom and steering and how to address uncertainty inherent 
in research and innovation. The RRI approach still encounters the so-called 
‘Collingridge dilemma’ according to which, during the early stages of research, 
too little is known to regulate emerging technology, while later when technology 
is more extensively developed and used, it is difficult to modify it via regulation 
(Stilgoe et al. 2013).
Actors involved in the governance of  
dual-use neuroscience research in the HBP
To address the complex issues described above, a wide range of actors, internal 
and external to the HBP, have been involved in developing and implementing 
the governance of dual-use research. Internal actors are the project’s governing 
bodies, researchers and administrators from diverse disciplines and teams within 
the project. External actors are the European Commission as a funder as well as 
diverse stakeholders from citizens and patients to experts, other brain initiatives 
and international bodies such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD), which developed guidelines for governance of 
neuroscience and neurotechnology.
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The HBP’s Ethics and Society division has undertaken a leading role in the 
development of the governance of dual-use research in the HBP. The Ethics and 
Society division brings together research from social sciences and humanities, 
ethicists and public engagement practitioners from a number of universities and 
research entities across Europe. As a major EU initiative in a highly sensitive 
research area, the HBP implements a broad RRI agenda to identify and address 
major ethical and societal concerns (Stahl et al. 2019). In particular, the HBP 
implements the AREA framework of the EPSRC, which was one of the first 
frameworks available for a practical implementation of the HBP. According to the 
AREA framework, anticipation activities implemented by the HBP’s Ethics and 
Society division include foresight analysis of future development of neuroscience 
and ICT developed by the HBP, while reflection activities focus on philosophical 
and neuroethical research. Engagement involves citizen workshops and online 
consultations to understand public views on neuroscience, while action focuses on 
developing and implementing processes, procedures and good practices to support 
RRI in the HBP. Thus, the HBP Ethics and Society division implements a wide-
ranging research and practice agenda that goes well beyond complying with the 
FP regulatory requirements and includes anticipation, reflection, engagement and 
action on the conceptual and practical underpinnings of the regulatory require-
ments, their limitations and the ways of overcoming them.
These principles of going beyond the legal FP requirements, critically reflect-
ing on them and suggesting broader ethical and social agendas are also present 
in the HBP Ethics and Society team’s work on dual-use. The key element of this 
work is the ‘Opinion on “Responsible Dual-Use”: Political, Security, Intelligence 
and Military Research of Concern in Neuroscience and Neurotechnology’ (Ethics 
and Society 2018). This is the second opinion of the HBP Ethics and Society team, 
following the first one on Data Protection and Privacy published in the previous 
year. The Dual-Use Opinion starts with the recognition that ‘current and newly 
emerging insights and technologies arising from research in brain sciences 
increase capabilities to access, assess and affect thought, emotion and behaviour’ 
(Ethics and Society 2018). These capabilities can be used in socially beneficial as 
well as harmful ways. Examples mentioned in the Opinion include:
brain inspired neuro- and ICT technologies that are already in use or in 
advanced stages of development, for example, in warfighter ‘enhancement’, 
intelligence gathering, image analysis, threat detection, manipulation of 
emotional states, incapacitation of adversaries, and the development of 
autonomous or semi-autonomous weapons, or weaponized robots using arti-
ficial intelligence technologies and machine learning algorithms for target 
detection an elimination.
(Ethics and Society 2018: 5–6)
Thus, the Opinion discusses important social and ethical questions these devel-
opments raise and develops a set of recommendations for the HBP, the EU and 
social actors.
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The preparation of the Dual-Use Opinion took several years and was done 
according to the RRI principles and the AREA framework of anticipation, 
reflection, engagement and action. The anticipation activities included a 
number of scoping reports to identify current and potential applications of 
brain research and brain-inspired technologies and their social and ethical 
implications. The reflection part focused on the conceptual clarification of 
dual-use terminology and identification of ambiguities in existing regulations 
and guidelines. The engagement part consisted of a broad range of activities 
involving experts on dual-use and neuroscience and research policy makers 
as well as citizens in webinars, workshops and online consultations. The 
results of the engagement activities have been made public to researchers and 
stakeholders within and beyond the HBP and some of these activities have 
been positively evaluated by neuroscience and dual-use experts as ‘a first 
promising step in the direction of awareness-enhancing strategies’ (Ienca et al. 
2018: 273). The anticipation, reflection and engagement activities resulted in 
preparing recommendations for action.
One of the key insights from the preparatory work was the need to go beyond 
the binary civilian–military distinction of the dual-use definition used in the 
Horizon 2020 approach to ethics and to broaden it. To do that, the Dual-Use 
Opinion develops a broader set of terminology, building on terms such as dual-
use research of concern, RRI and political, security, intelligence and military 
research of concern. The Opinion suggests that applying the principles of RRI to 
the concept of dual-use could increase the ability to identify which programmes 
and projects of research, development and innovation are ‘of concern’ and dis-
tinguish between ‘responsible’ and ‘irresponsible’ systems of research and 
technological development. Accordingly, the Opinion uses the term ‘dual-use 
research of concern’ to refer to:
neuroscience research and technological innovations, and brain inspired 
developments in information and communication technologies, for use in 
the political, security, intelligence and military domains, which are either 
directly of concern because of their potential for use in ways that threaten 
the peace, health, safety, security and well-being of citizens, or are under-
taken without responsible regard to such potential uses.
(Ethics and Society 2018: 5)
Thus, the identification of research ‘of concern’ is not straightforward but rather 
is a matter of debate. The RRI principles should enable such a debate, capacity 
building to reflect and engagement of researchers and stakeholders. In the 
Opinion, responsibility does not simply refer to responsible conduct of indi-
viduals but also
to processes and practices within research and development systems, and 
the extent to which they encourage or constrain the capacity of all those 
involved in the management and operations of research to reflect upon, 
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anticipate and consider the potential social and ethical implications of their 
research, to encourage open discussion of these, with a view to ensuring 
that their research and development does indeed contribute to the health and 
well-being of citizens, and to peace and security.
(Ethics and Society 2018: 9)
Thus, responsibility here means developing institutions and cultures that support 
socially beneficial research.
To implement these principles of responsibility, the Opinion recommends 
that the HBP evaluates the potential implications for dual-use research of 
concern, ensures a responsible use of its data and services, considers conditions 
for partnering with institutions that receive military funding and develops educa-
tional activities and materials on dual-use. Furthermore, the Opinion includes a 
number of recommendations for the EU. These include suggestions to extend its 
policies on dual-use research beyond the focus on aims, objectives and inten-
tions of the researchers, to support research on dual-use research of concern and 
to establish an advisory body to have an oversight of all EU funded research 
with political, security, intelligence and military potentials. The recommenda-
tions to other social actors include a strong focus on the education of neuro-
scientists on social and ethical issues including questions of dual-use as well as 
on self-regulation of research institutions and industry.
The HBP governing bodies have approved the Opinion and established the 
HBP Dual-Use Working Group to implement its recommendations. This 
working group includes researchers, engineers and administrators from all HBP 
divisions.
Challenges for developing and implementing  
governance structures for dual-use research at  
the project level
Addressing issues related to dual-use research at the project level presents a 
number of challenges related to the complexity and sensitivity of the topic as 
well as uncertainties about potential uses and impacts of research results. On the 
basis of the ongoing work in the HBP discussed above, three challenges can be 
highlighted: first, limitations of the dual-use definition used in the EU FP; 
second, issues of education and awareness raising; and third, questions of global 
collaboration. These challenges can be relevant for research in other scientific 
disciplines and fields as well.
First, the FPs use a definition of dual-use from the EU export control regula-
tion (see Vila Seoane, Chapter 5 in this book). According to that definition, the 
dual-use items are goods, software and technologies, which ‘are normally used 
for civilian purposes but may have military applications, or may contribute to 
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction’ (European Commission 
2019b: 13). Two limitations of this definition in particular can be highlighted. 
First, for basic research at the early stages of development, the definition’s focus 
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on goods, items and software often is not relevant. Second, this definition still 
defines dual-use in binary terms of military versus civilian, while practitioners 
and scholars in this field have recognised that a broader understanding of bene-
ficial and harmful uses is needed (Ienca et al. 2018; Oltmann 2015). Thus, rather 
than inviting anticipation and reflection on the potential future uses of research 
that is at early stages, for many scientists doing basic research, this definition 
suggests that dual-use questions are not relevant for them. To address this chal-
lenge, the Ethics and Society division of the HBP suggested broadening the 
understanding of dual-use by bringing in concepts of dual-use research of 
concern, RRI and political, security, intelligence and military research of 
concern. In a similar manner, future EU research funding programmes could 
benefit by broadening their approach to dual-use and developing definitions that 
are dedicated to specificity of research by adjusting and going beyond dual-use 
definitions in export controls.
Second, building governance structures for dual-use research at the project 
level requires the involvement and support from the researchers. One limita-
tion that such an approach faces is a lack of awareness about dual-use issues 
among researchers. Ethical and social issues of science and technology are not 
always included in science education nor are they required, supported or built 
into research career structures. The HBP has started to address these issues 
within the project’s dedicated Education programme that includes workshops, 
online lectures and webinars on ethical and social issues including dual-use. 
To make such education and awareness-raising activities relevant, a particular 
challenge is to adjust them to the specificities of each scientific discipline and 
research field. That is not a straightforward task in a multidisciplinary project 
bringing together scientists and researchers with very diverse scientific back-
grounds. At the institutional and policy levels, the importance of education 
and awareness of dual-use issues among scientists cannot be underestimated 
and novel ways to engage and support scientists in these endeavours need to 
be sought.
The third challenge focuses on global collaboration for addressing dual-use 
research issues. As research is global and scientific knowledge flows freely 
across national and regional borders, it is of paramount importance that dual-
use issues are recognised at the global level. In the neuroscience field, the need 
to address issues of misuse has been recently recognised by the representatives 
of International Brain Initiative (Rommelfanger et al. 2018) that brings 
together the main large-scale neuroscience projects from the EU, USA, China, 
Japan, Australia, Canada and South Korea (see information in the Introduction) 
as well as by the OECD in its Recommendation of the Council on Responsible 
Innovation in Neurotechnology (OECD 2019). At the moment, the HBP is the 
only one among the main neuroscience projects that is developing and imple-
menting dedicated governance structures to address issues of dual-use and 
potential misuse. To facilitate responsible neuroscience research globally, 
similar activities in other brain projects and global coordination efforts are 
needed.
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Conclusions
This chapter demonstrates that the fast-developing field of neuroscience research 
not only promises major health, economic and technological benefits, but also 
raises important concerns about the potential misuse or harmful uses of research 
results. To address these concerns, appropriate governance structures should be 
built at the global, regional, national, institutional and project levels. The chapter 
shows that the research project level plays a key role in the governance of 
 dual-use research. At the same time, the project-level governance is closely 
intertwined with governance at other levels.
The chapter reveals how one of the main neuroscience research projects 
worldwide – the EU-funded HBP – addresses a number of challenges such as 
the limitations of the EU FP’s definition of dual-use based on the export control 
regulation and focusing on binary distinction between civilian and military 
applications by developing a novel approach that incorporates concepts of dual-
use research of concern, RRI and political, security, intelligence and military 
research of concern. The development and implementation of such an approach 
benefits from engaging a broad range of researchers, stakeholders, experts and 
citizens. The lessons learned so far suggest the need for education and awareness-
raising activities, global collaboration and reconsideration of policy definitions of 
dual-use and their suitability for research activities. The HBP, as a large-scale 
project, benefits from having dedicated Ethics and Society as well as Education 
teams for the development and implementation of its project-level governance of 
dual-use research. Nevertheless, lessons learned and practices developed in this 
project could be  relevant for other brain initiatives as well as research projects in 
other disciplines.
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